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Critique in the 21st century
Political economy still, and religion again
Étienne Balibar
We gather once again to examine the question 
of ‘critique’.1 We do so not just after Kant, Marx, 
Nietzsche and their respective descendants, but also 
after the innovations of the Frankfurt School (which 
only came to receive serious attention in France after 
some delay) and the critique of the foundations of 
psychology, to evoke George Politzer’s title, which, 
albeit with a number of adjustments and reversals, 
runs through the whole French epistemological 
tradition, both during and after the ‘structuralist 
moment’.2 Needless to say, we don’t embark on this 
examination from an abstract or timeless perspective, 
but caught up in the middle of a conjuncture that 
we are all trying to understand. What are its tenden-
cies and conflictual stakes? What alternatives does 
it present? From the place where we find ourselves, 
we try to assess the characteristic features of this 
conjuncture – the signs of the times – in order to 
reformulate the meaning and fields of critique and 
perhaps also to refound it. As unrepentant ‘moderns’, 
we believe that critique has not ceased to designate 
philosophy’s most characteristic gesture, and we 
seek more than ever to understand how the current 
situation must change critique itself, conceived as 
an analysis of ‘what we are’, as Foucault used to 
say – which in reality means an analysis of what 
we are becoming, or turning into, one that cannot 
prescribe its culmination in advance. Through an 
essential circularity, we need to recast critique in 
order to provide a diagnosis of the present, but we 
can only orient this recasting by following certain 
paths derived from the way we already presuppose, 
if not prejudge, a diagnosis of the present. 
Crisis and critique
As a supplementary determination to these general 
points, I shall borrow from the famous title of 
Koselleck’s 1959 book Critique and Crisis (poorly trans-
lated into French as Le Règne de la critique). Beyond 
the book’s contents (essential reading for any discus-
sion of the origins of the Enlightenment programme), 
Koselleck’s title trades on an idea that, for one reason 
or another, we have never quite managed to escape: 
namely, that ‘critique’ is essentially related to ‘crisis’, 
or to the manifestation, through certain signs, of 
a time as a time of crisis. The crisis renders the 
contradictions visible, and in so doing brings to the 
fore the internal structure of the world (particularly 
the political world, the social world) that is to be the 
object of the critique. Or, inversely: crisis summons 
critique to produce the instruments, the elements 
of intelligibility, which would allow for an analysis 
and resolution. And as it happens, we are at this 
moment and in this place besieged by signs of crisis 
and by interpretations of its nature, which start with 
ways of naming it. Maybe that should put us on our 
guard, because, in a certain way, the crisis–critique 
correlation works a little too well. But how to elude it? 
There are two remarks I would like to make on 
this score. The first is that the couple crisis–critique 
has determined the programme of the social sci-
ences from the start of the nineteenth century up 
until today. More generally, it has determined the 
programme of the ‘social philosophies’ (to which 
Marxism belongs) that have sought to define the 
objectives and practical functions of these sciences, 
because critique is rooted, on the one hand, in the 
manifestation of phenomena of conflict, contradic-
tion, alienation, anomie or pathology (all of which 
form the reverse, or the repressed, of the regularity 
of social relations, and hence hold the hidden truth of 
that regularity); and on the other, in the manifesta-
tion of phenomena of interruption (provisional or 
definitive) of their regulation, or of their reproduction, 
which convey that combination of contingency and 
necessity – in a word, historicity – upon which ‘socie-
ties’ and ‘social formations’ rest. Hence the privilege 
enjoyed by the idea of revolution, even under the form 
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of an unfinished or suppressed revolution.3 One of the 
terminologies available to us to express this dialectic 
is the antithesis of organic phases and formations and 
critical phases and formations (meaning crisis forma-
tions). In the prevailing representation – elaborated 
by the Saint-Simonians at the start of the nineteenth 
century and rediscovered by Gramsci in the middle of 
the twentieth – these phases or formations succeed 
one another periodically, though they can also be 
understood as ‘instances’ [instances] imbricated in one 
another, with fluctuating relations of dominance.4 
The underlying idea is that critique, as a mode of 
thought that proceeds from critical phenomena, must 
in the end return to those phenomena if it wants to 
elucidate or transform them.
Here, though, I must make another remark. That 
we are, here and now, in Europe and elsewhere, knee-
deep in a ‘critical phase’, or a phase in which the 
‘pathologies’ of social life, of the mode of economic 
development, of collective identities, are all coming to 
the fore, is a widely shared sentiment and an inten-
sive object of study for sociologists, psychologists, 
political commentators, and so on. More and more, 
however, these judgements are overdetermined by 
eschatological connotations. This is especially the case 
with the insistence on the notion of ‘world’, which is 
called forth by the reference to globalization as the 
site and origin of the crisis, but whose evocation is 
filtered through the multiple registers of the social 
world considered in the totality of its extension and 
determinations, as ‘world-system’ for some, as ‘civi-
lization’ for others (Immanuel Wallerstein, Jean-Luc 
Nancy).5 What is in crisis is a ‘world on a world scale’ 
(or on a planetary scale). Linking these two gives rise 
to an issue that impacts, to a whole new degree, the 
circularity in the formulation of our critical tasks 
and objectives. It is by no means a given that the 
antithesis – organic/critical, normal/pathological, 
regular/state of exception, constitution/dissolution 
– remains an applicable tool of investigation in the 
context of the ‘global crisis’ or, to parody Marx, of 
the ‘developed totality’ (The German Ideology). Or it 
could be that the antithesis of two stages and two 
phases – which, if we think about it, is constitutive 
of the very idea of society or social relation – is what 
has to become the very object of critical reflection, 
or, if you prefer, of its deconstruction: it is what 
deterritorializes critique by depriving it of the possi-
bility of positioning itself either from the perspective 
of normality (so as to identify the exceptions and 
pathologies) or from the perspective of pathologies 
(so as to discuss the value of norms and the degree 
of organicity of social forms). If that is the case, then 
the legitimacy and orientation of critique no longer 
stem from a foundational antithesis, but rather, and 
only, from its exercise, from the way it criticizes itself, 
and that is perilous …
And yet. And yet, it is my plan today to stick to that 
old schema, and to give it a formulation that may, 
I hope, echo the concerns of many of us gathered 
here. It seems to me that the source of the calls for 
a renewal, maybe even a displacement, of critique, is 
the fact that the crisis affects, and globally so, the pos-
sibility of politics as a collective activity, and hence as 
a privileged form of the articulation between institu-
tions and modes of subjectivation that allow human 
communities to represent themselves as agents in 
their own history – a form of self-consciousness for 
which the West, at least, has developed and univer-
salized a number of names; citizenship chief among 
them, both in the privileged case of the nation-state, 
and in the forms of protest that have always accom-
panied it. Citizenship, under siege and reduced to 
impotence, has been devalued or deprived of meaning 
– as have, indeed, other categories closely associated 
with it, such as conflict, representation, militant 
activity, participation in public affairs. A particularly 
acute manifestation of this, as we know, is the fact 
that democratic institutions have degenerated and 
been emptied of their content in that part of the 
world where they were erected as a dominant value, 
while at the same time remaining conspicuous by 
their absence in other parts of the world, where they 
are perceived, at best, as an artificial foreign graft 
and, at worst, as a masked form of domination and 
alienation.6 
There are exceptions to this, of course, and thank-
fully so. But their viability and mutual compatibility 
have still to be demonstrated. One hypothesis we 
can formulate, adhering closely to a certain Marxist 
logic while turning it against some of its postulates 
about the philosophy of history, is that we are only 
now entering capitalist society (and, as always, we 
are only noticing this after the fact, when it is late, 
perhaps even too late) – or, if you prefer, we’re only 
now entering ‘pure’ capitalism, which does not have 
to deal constantly with heterogeneous social forces 
that it must either incorporate or repress, or with 
which it must strike some sort of compromise. ‘Pure’ 
capitalism is free to deal only with the effects of its 
own logic of accumulation and with those things 
necessary for its own reproduction.7 
Now, it could be, regardless of what Marx thought 
about this, that modern forms of politics, and in 
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particular the forms of this ‘great politics’ whose 
stakes are the antithesis and the varied combinations 
of the relation to the nation (hence to the state, to 
the law and legal subjects, to laïcité, education, war), 
as well as the relation to class and class differences 
(hence to social inequalities and social policies, to 
reforms and revolutions), are characteristic not of 
capitalism as such, but of the transition to capitalism. 
This would be a very long drawn out transition, cer-
tainly, and we are only now realizing that it needed 
nearly four centuries to run its course – assuming, 
that is, that we situate the beginnings of this transi-
tion to capitalism in mercantilism, manufacture, the 
‘discovery’ of a world to colonize, the proletarianiza-
tion of farmers, and the emergence of constitutional 
states that ‘monopolized’ legitimate violence and the 
power to judge. As it happens, that is where Koselleck 
situates the origin of the articulation between critique 
and crisis. But what is an ‘end’, exactly? What are the 
determinations of this ‘end’, and, more specifically, 
what is it that, with it, starts to exist and to dominate, 
in the Marxian sense of herrschend (herrschende Klasse, 
herrschende Ideologie)? These questions are as much 
epistemological as political, and they are among the 
most urgent tasks facing the efforts to renew critique, 
or give it a new foundation.8 
Economy and theology: the chassé-croisé 
of violence
Let us venture a step further. I would say that what 
seems to characterize the world-scale dimensions 
[la mondialité] of the ‘crisis’ – which is at once local 
and global, and is not foreign to the eschatological 
connotations it takes on in our discourses and con-
science – is the superposition of two ‘phenomena’ 
that seem at first sight heterogeneous, but that we 
can try to relate to one another in a quasi-analytical, 
or perhaps pseudo-analytical, schema. The first is 
the emergence of an economy of generalized violence 
that cuts across borders and combines endemic wars 
with other forms of exterminating violence – indeed, 
eliminating violence, since what is involved is not 
death in the strict sense, even if there are at this 
moment many deaths, under different modalities.9 
Exclusion, for example, or, perhaps even better, to 
use the category that Saskia Sassen recently deployed 
with impressive force and scope, the generalized 
expulsion of individuals and groups from their ‘place’ 
in the world, in any world whatever.10 No one doubts 
that violence is immemorial, that it assumes myriad 
forms and has myriad causes, or that it is an anthro-
pological characteristic of the human being as such. 
But the violence that seems able to cut across any and 
every border, and indeed to use borders themselves 
as the instruments of its own generalization, is in a 
way a new phenomenon whose novelty rests on the 
fact that every person may in time be potentially 
confronted by it.11 The second phenomenon I have in 
mind is the superposition or, better yet, the chassé-
croisé of political economy and political theology, or 
the theologico-political. We are now approaching the 
question that we need to ask. To convey what seems 
to be a widely held view today (and I don’t believe 
this view is exclusively French, even if it undoubtedly 
owes a fair share of its evidence to a certain ‘French’ 
way of thinking the autonomy of politics), I would 
propose the following formulation: we no longer have 
enough political economy (or politics in economics), but 
we have too much political theology (or too much theo-
logy in politics). 
In what we commonly refer to as the ‘return of 
the religious’, I include certain ways of asserting or 
imposing laïcité, as themselves deeply religious forms 
of reacting to what is perceived as a ‘re-theologization’ 
of social conflicts or their modalities of self-con-
sciousness. (But how to separate social conflicts from 
their self-consciousness, since the latter is precisely 
what renders them ‘conflictual’ in the first place?) 
There is no need here to try to retrace and survey the 
entire field of fundamentalisms – Islamic, but also 
Hindu, Jewish and Christian (Christian above all, in 
a significant number of countries in the West and 
the South) – in the face of which one would also have 
to describe the no less impressive range of practices 
of non- or anti-violence that find their inspiration, 
language, and the models of conduct they want to put 
in place and share with others, in religious traditions, 
which they have reinterpreted to a greater of lesser 
degree. Hence Derrida’s question (thinking primarily, 
about the Middle East): 
Wars and military ‘interventions’, led by the Judeo-
Christian West in the name of the best causes … 
are they not also, from a certain side, wars of re-
ligion? To determine a war of religion as such, one 
would have to be certain that one can delimit the 
religious. One would have to be sure that one can 
distinguish all the predicates of the religious.12 
For my part, I would say that the phenomeno-
logical criterion at work in current analyses is that 
the religious emerges where the economy ceases to 
be thought and practised as a political institution, in 
keeping with its old denomination as political economy, 
a perspective which was gradually abandoned as the 
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power of states seemed more and more out of step 
with the autonomization of markets, and of financial 
markets in particular. In other words, the chassé-
croisé is always already present within each of the 
two phenomena, neither of which is independent of 
the other. 
Hence the two questions that preoccupy our con-
temporaries, not separately, but in tandem. How to 
rethink the theologico-political? And how to evaluate 
the degree of distance possible between the economy 
and its modes of political regulation? The term ‘gov-
ernance’, thematized for the first time by the World 
Bank in the 1990s and now in general use, pinpoints 
the ambivalence of the second process, because it 
can designate, depending on the author, either a 
real withdrawal of politics – whose function is to 
support and manage social adaptations to the self-
regulation of markets – or, conversely, the emergence 
of, or simply the demand for, a new political practice, 
reserved for new actors whose transnational legiti-
macy no longer depends on their authorization by a 
state.13 As for the first question, about the meaning 
of the theologico-political complex, it continues to 
turn within the circle that was assigned to it by the 
two inventors of the formula, who are separated by 
nearly three centuries, at each extreme of modernity: 
Spinoza and Carl Schmitt.14 That is to say, it is taken 
to indicate either that the ‘theological’ or the ‘theo-
cratic’ is a specific political regime (or, more precisely, 
a tendency towards the sacralization of power, and 
likewise of any counter-power, at work in every other 
political regime), or that secular models of political 
authority (notably those founded on the law as a more 
or less complete subordination of the exception to the 
norm) derive their meaning and symbolic power from 
religious models. If this circle has started turning 
anew, is it not because the reference of the political 
(and of political action) to the state – whether as its 
necessary framework or as the system of power that 
it tries to overflow, or from which it wants to free 
itself (and, by the same token, to which it risks being 
eternally dependent) – is a reality that is less and less 
consistent, or, at any rate, less autonomous?
To Derrida’s question regarding the ‘predicates of 
the religious’, we cannot but add at least two more 
questions, about the predicates of the political and 
the economic. The economy of generalized violence 
manifests both the phenomenon of the withdrawal of 
politics into economics (that is to say, the disappear-
ance of the political for the benefit of the economic, 
and the absorption of the political by a ‘pure’ eco-
nomic logic even when the latter can be described 
in its own way as a new politics that functions on the 
mode of denegation) and that of the vacillation of the 
theologico-political between a politicization of the 
theological and a theologization of politics. Never-
theless, the economy of generalized violence can be 
described as a double crisis: of the historical affilia-
tions and memberships of individuals (which means 
also a hierarchization of these memberships for the 
benefit of a sovereign political order), and of the 
established modalities, gradually institutionalized, of 
social conflictuality – or, if we prefer, of the ‘struggles’ 
among ‘parties’.15 
In this conflictuality, the class struggle repre-
sented, for two centuries, both in Europe and else-
where, a limit form, or a form of radicalization that 
situates itself on the ‘shores’ of politics (to evoke 
Jacques Rancière) or, more precisely, on the shift-
ing border that separates and articulates civilized 
modalities of the ‘social war’ (also called ‘civil war’ 
by antiphrasis). And it does so while opening up the 
possibilities for transcommunitarian and, in particu-
lar, transnational memberships that could be called 
nomadic in relation to instituted and territorialized 
political communities. 
You can already see the position I am heading 
towards. On the one hand, we must take seriously 
the hypothesis that the ‘return of the religious’ – 
under the form of a growing affirmation of collec-
tive identities of the religious sort (for all manner 
of mutually antithetical ends), to the detriment of 
identities assigned or recognized by the state, in com-
petition with them, or seizing them from within – is 
a consequence of the decline of ‘collective subjectiva-
tions’ that were elicited by earlier forms of political 
conflictuality or civil conflict. (Rancière suggested 
this in a recent interview.)16 On the other hand, this 
hypothesis can be no more than a starting point, a 
provisional formulation, since we are not in a posi-
tion to tell whether the religious that ‘returns’ is 
actually the same as the one that had – only more 
or less, in reality – ‘departed’, like a return of the 
repressed. That is to say, we don’t know, deep down, 
what the ‘religious’ is, or indeed whether there is such 
a thing at all, and under what perspective it can be 
unified, or even compared. Likewise, we don’t know 
how economic governance, which subordinates states 
to the imperatives of the market, a process that is 
tempting to explain in terms of an entrance into 
‘pure capitalism’, is articulated with the affirmations 
of religious identity in order to engender the new field 
in which societies are confronted with inconvertible 
violence.17 
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A detour through Marx
At this point I shall take a detour through Marx, or 
at least through certain moments of his thought, 
because a lot is being said today about how Marx 
contributed to obscuring the importance of the 
theologico-political problem, and more generally the 
problem of the religious factor in history, because he 
trained his attention exclusively on the social causes 
and economic contradictions of capitalism, arguing 
that, ‘in the last resort’, these are the determining 
factors of the historical processes whose manifesta-
tions we find in our present.18 This is both true and 
false. In this instance, though, the modality is more 
significant than the overall thesis, or rather it helps 
to determine its meaning. 
We can, once again, start from the famous formu-
lations that open (and close) ‘A Contribution to the 
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction’, 
which appeared in 1844 in the Deutsch-Französische 
Jahrbücher: 
the critique of religion is essentially completed; and 
the critique of religion is the prerequisite of every 
critique. … The foundation of irreligious criticism 
is this: man makes religion; religion does not make 
man. … But man is not an abstract being squat-
ting outside the world. Man is the world of man [der 
Mensch, das ist die Welt des Menschen] – the state, 
society. … Thus, the critique of religion is the cri-
tique in embryo of the vale of tears of which religion 
is the halo. … Thus the critique of heaven is trans-
formed into the critique of the earth, the critique 
of religion into the critique of law [Recht], and the 
critique of theology into the critique of politics.19 
I don’t believe Marx ever revisited this formulation, 
and even if it is important to mark the difference 
separating the critique of right and politics from the 
critique of political economy – regardless of whether 
we call it a ‘break’ – the idea that the critique of 
religion has been completed remains a presupposition 
of his entire critical enterprise. Indeed, we can even 
say that it becomes more than that when the critique 
of the ‘vale of tears’ became ‘earthly’ or, at least, more 
tightly bound to the study of the conditions of pro-
duction and reproduction of the material conditions 
of existence in human societies. 
What is immediately striking, upon rereading this 
text, is the extent to which it appears indissociable 
from Marx’s insistence on the anthropological ques-
tion. ‘Materialist’ anthropology against ‘spiritualist’ 
anthropology. First, it’s the social human being who 
makes religion, rather than having been ‘made’ by 
it; anthropology itself, in other words, determines 
the modalities of the constitution of the religious 
imagination and the functions it can fulfil in history, 
whether this be to consolidate modes of domination 
or to ‘protest’ against them. Second, this is an anthro-
pology of the relation or ‘link’ [rapport], and not an 
anthropology of the essence or ‘genre’.20 I think we 
can see in a text like this (and in others from the 
same period that complete it, particularly the ‘Theses 
on Feuerbach’) the foundation of a Marxian philo-
sophical anthropology.21 ‘It is the human being who 
makes religion’ is, by definition, a humanist thesis; 
we might even say – in the context of a critical enter-
prise – that it is the humanist thesis par excellence. 
But the fact of calling it into question, particularly 
by adopting a materialist approach to the question 
of what precisely ‘the human world’ means, does not 
ipso facto eliminate the anthropological question. 
Quite the contrary: it is a way of reformulating and 
giving a different orientation to that question. 
We can see this clearly if we just focus our atten-
tion on how the two reductions that Marx needs to 
operate in order to interpret ‘the human world’ are 
connected. There is, on the one hand, the reduc-
tion of being or of the human essence to a ‘set of 
social relations’. I am myself tempted to call this an 
expansive reduction, paradoxical as the expression 
may seem, because it shines a light on a general-
ized intersubjectivity or transindividuality, of which 
the construction of religious communities is a part, 
as are the construction of imaginary communities 
and ‘civil societies’. There is, on the other hand, the 
reduction of the set of social relations to the form of 
labour or the status of a labour-product that is in the 
final analysis derived from productive or reproductive 
activity itself, both ‘manual’ and ‘intellectual’ (The 
German Ideology). Nor can we forget or overlook the 
fact that what human beings ‘make’, they can like-
wise ‘transform’ (verändern) or ‘remake’ differently. In 
sum, we cannot forget that the reality human beings 
‘make’ is a ‘transformable’ (veränderbar) reality.22 That 
is why Marx will say later that mankind ‘inevitably 
only sets itself such tasks as it is able to solve’.23 
Here, once again, we notice a bifurcation, though not 
between (humanist) anthropology and (materialist) 
ontology, but within anthropology itself, even though 
the latter implies an ontology. 
What conclusions, then, are we to draw from this 
observation, which is in some ways a critique of 
Marx, or a redoubled application to Marx himself of 
the critical instrument? We need to proceed slowly 
here, or, rather, with a certain sense of discernment. 
On the one hand, we can say that Marx shares the 
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thesis that the movement of history in the modern 
period is that of a gradual secularization, though there 
is something original in his formulation of it. For 
Marx, the principle of the transformation of socie-
ties is the restoration or the becoming visible of the 
material causality that, from their ‘origins’, would 
have engendered all the modalities under which soci-
eties ‘make’ or ‘produce’ their own social relations, 
as well as the phenomenal form (Erscheinungsform) 
under which these must appear to their subjects or 
bearers. This, incidentally, goes hand in hand with a 
fundamental evolutionism, one that is not original 
to Marx in the nineteenth century, though he did 
elaborate an original variant of it, more contradictory 
than other versions, but ultimately more unstable as 
well. On the other hand, the radicality of his thesis – 
that the source of religious alienation is to be found 
solely in the anthropological function of labour and 
in the relations of production that give it its historical 
expression – is the very thing that opens the way for 
the analysis of the economy as an ‘anti-religion’; or, 
if you like, for the analysis of the economic representa-
tions of the ‘world’ constructed by the economy in the 
capitalist epoch. But in Capital Marx will show that 
the economy does not exist without the ‘representa-
tions’ or ‘appearances’ that render its own ‘economic 
laws’ operational. In speaking about ‘anti-religion’, I 
intentionally use the prefix ‘anti’ in its double logical 
sense: anti-religion is what opposes itself to religion 
so as to destroy it, to ‘profane’ it, as Marx says in The 
Communist Manifesto, and it is also what faces religion 
and reproduces – as if in a mirror, mimetically – its 
imaginary functioning, particularly the effects of 
belief and subjection. Thus a reflection on Marx and 
a rereading of his work do not render impossible 
and unthinkable those critical gestures aimed at 
reintroducing the theologico-political question as 
a fundamentally political question in the wake of 
the question about political economy, as a question 
lodged in its heart and always intertwined with it. 
On the contrary, such reflection and such reread-
ing are one of the conditions of possibility of this 
reintroduction.
What we must retain from Marx is that there is 
something of the theological (for example, in money) 
in societies ‘secularized’ by the always increasingly 
totalitarian grip of the economy, and even of the 
religious, under the forms of the rituals of daily life 
that are guided by the fetishism of exchange value, 
and by the hallucinatory perception of the ‘bodies’ 
of merchandise as the ‘incarnation’ or embodiment 
of their value, even if these rituals take place outside 
the traditional space of ‘religion’ in the historical 
sense of the term; that is, an institutional space that 
enjoys legal and political sanction. If we do not take 
anti-religion into account, in the sense above, then 
perhaps the entire question of the metamorphoses of 
the religious in the capitalist epoch (including here the 
‘returns of the religious’ in the moment of its crisis) 
will remain inaccessible to critical analysis. That 
said, we must also, tirelessly, raise the question of 
the blinding consequences that his opening postulate 
operates across his work: ‘the critique of religion is 
complete’, particularly in the form of a persistent den-
egation of the fact that, in the anthropological thesis 
that reduces the essence of the human being to the 
idea of the producer (which contains the connotation 
of creator), there is an anti-religious signification that 
can always be turned into a religious one. 
The regime of the constitution of bodies
There is no need to insist too much here on the way 
in which, at the end of the same text from 1844 (‘A 
Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy 
of Right: Introduction’), the messianic figure of the 
proletariat appears as the redeemer of humanity: 
the producer radically dispossessed of his or her own 
creation, a figure that becomes even more emphatic 
in the later ‘expropriation of the expropriators’, and in 
the way this messianism was later ‘routinized’ by the 
secular religions of historical or so-called ‘actually 
existing’ socialism. That’s too well known to detain 
us.24 It seems more interesting to try to identify a sen-
sitive point where a new critique of political economy 
– one that extends and deepens while also rectifying 
Marx’s – can be articulated with a critique of religion, 
and this in the double sense of understanding its 
signification, and resisting religion’s pretensions to 
an exclusive universality. I am tempted to use for that 
the expression ‘point of heresy’, in the etymological 
sense of choice or theoretical bifurcation, even if, in 
this instance, the aim is not to describe a divergence 
starting from a common ‘epistemological’ ground (as 
in Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge), but rather to 
arrive at a virtual convergence, one that cannot, for 
all that, issue in any real reunification.25 It seems to 
me that we can identify this point of heresy in the 
way in which a critique of political economy and 
of political theory (or of the religious) must treat 
the status and function of bodies, and consequently 
describe the anthropological differences that are 
inseparable from the way human beings use their 
bodies. L’uso dei corpi, Agamben would say. They 
are also inseparable from the way ‘human societies’ 
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humanize themselves (and do so by dehumanizing 
themselves) by prescribing to the individuals that 
compose them a certain use of differences linked to 
the body – particularly the difference between the 
manual and intellectual aspects of labour, and sexual 
difference. This, of course, opens the way for different 
forms of ‘embodied’ resistance and emancipation.26
I would like to advance two hypotheses that strive 
to distance themselves somewhat from the discourses 
currently in the air about ‘biopolitics’, while never-
theless intersecting with them on several points. 
The first concerns the idea that the point around 
which collective cultural practices and a symbolic 
architecture of the religious type are articulated is a 
prescription that concerns the body, and in particular 
the manifestation of the difference of sexualized 
bodies (be they two or more).27 As we know, cultural 
practices can be very diverse and mutually contradic-
tory, not just because they develop over long periods 
of time in very different contexts and civilizations, but 
because they combine different forms of ‘invention’ 
and ‘respect’ for the tradition, with contradictory 
tendencies about how to adapt to, or resist, moderni-
zation and commodification. In 
religious discourse (particularly 
that of revealed, monotheistic 
religions), rituals and beliefs are 
tightly superposed and inter-
twined. And so, too, as Derrida 
suggests in his rearticulation of 
the idea of ‘the two sources of 
religion’, are the hope of salva-
tion, of deliverance from evil, 
of immunity, and the reference 
to the name [au nom], to the law 
that forges the communal link 
(ideal or institutional) among 
believers and the faithful. This 
name can be equivocal; it can 
be ‘instrumentalized’ by forces, 
ideologies and powers, though it 
must first be inscribed in a form 
of sacredness or prohibition. That is what makes 
the difference between the religious, strictly speak-
ing, and the simply cultural what determines that 
which, in religion, is always in excess in relation to the 
cultural, but eventually returns to mark and guide 
it. Let’s say, then, that the difference between religious 
discourses and their point of mutual untranslatability 
resides, in particular, maybe even specifically, not in 
the difference between dogmas, or in their narratives 
of origin (even if these are always strictly linked to the 
institution of anthropological differences), but in the 
different regimes, incompatible among themselves, that 
prescribe and prohibit the uses of bodies, or institute 
the visibility of bodies and their accessibility.28 So that 
these concrete universals, or these practical universali-
ties, which is what religious discourses are, particu-
larly the discourses of ‘revealed’ religions, are not in 
contradiction or in conflict with one another when 
they announce general truths, salvific beliefs, and 
prescriptions for a universalizable morality as the 
object of a predication – on this point, ecumenism 
or ‘interreligious dialogue’ is always at least virtually 
possible. But they do contradict each other and fight 
over the extent to which the sexualized body must be 
seen as the very site where signs of purity, election, 
obedience, sacrifice, asceticism and alliance are to be 
made manifest.
That is no doubt why all the studies of the reli-
gious character of humanity are comparative. But 
this comparison lacks an external point of view, since 
there is no human perspective sufficiently ‘distant’ 
from the body to see from outside it the difference of 
differences inscribed on the body.29 Hence the violence 
of the conflicts that have flared up, here and else-
where, around the question of the Islamic veil and 
the regime of manifest invisibility it imposes on sexual 
difference. Far be it for me to deny that the Islamic 
veil has something to do with the reproduction of 
a hierarchical relation between the sexes, one that 
can nevertheless be modulated or negotiated (or, as 
Butler puts it, ‘resignified’) in different ways. But 
in the phobic reactions it provokes in a French-like 
space of laïcité – and especially when these reactions 
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are institutionalized and prescribed as rules for the 
functioning of public institutions – we see quite 
clearly that what emerges is a religious conflict. It’s a 
conflict of religious universalisms concentrated around 
the singularity of the bodily regime that lies at the 
core of each of these universalisms. The question 
remains open, incidentally, whether this is an old 
conflict, for example between the two dominant ver-
sions of institutionalized Western monotheism (I’m 
not sure that it is), or a new, or at least relatively new, 
conflict: one that entails, in equal measure, a work 
of interpretation and the repetition of theological 
archetypes. This is as such a religious way of reacting 
to the violence of other social conflicts, especially 
since they are not regulated by a classical form of the 
state, with its ‘organic’ or ‘hegemonic’ social system, 
or taken in charge by revolutionary hopes and move-
ments. I leave this question open. 
The second hypothesis is intended to converge 
with the first without joining it, or to form with it 
a disjunctive theoretical machine (as Deleuze might 
have said) that allows us to ‘read’ certain aspects 
of the generalized violence that characterizes the 
current crisis. This time I align myself with a reprise 
of the critique of political economy. The critique 
Marx levelled at classical economic theorists pro-
duced a contradictory effect. It brought to the light 
of day an irreducible conflict lodged at the heart 
of the definition of capital, in so far as the latter 
imposes on ‘living labour’ the law or measure (and 
the violence) of accumulated ‘dead labour’. In doing 
so, however, Marx’s critique also helped to obscure 
from view some ideological postulates of these same 
classical economic theories, notably the ones linked 
to the definition of the ‘substance of value’ as labour 
(or abstract or generic labour), and those that tend to 
subordinate the crises of capitalism (notably its finan-
cial crises) to a finality, to a pre-established harmony 
(‘the invisible hand’) founded on a distribution, by 
society, of the labour forces available to it (and so, in 
the final analysis, of productive bodies) as a function 
of the needs it must satisfy to perpetuate itself. All of 
that could be summed up in the idea that the political 
economy of labour, which is also a political economy of 
labourers (and of their organized political ‘movement’), 
stands opposite and against the political economy of 
capital, as its internal reversal and as the manifestation 
of its hidden principle.30
There is nothing simple about this. All the best 
commentators on Marx have shown, albeit through 
different paths, that Marx never appropriates a concept 
from classical economics without transforming it. 
This is particularly true of ‘labour’, or ‘social labour’, 
which in Marx becomes inseparable from surplus-
labour, the producer of surplus-value: what matters, 
then, and this is the very bedrock of the critique, 
is not so much the ability to invoke labour ideally, 
in its abstract ‘measure’, in order to account for the 
commensurability of commodities on the market, but 
the fact that it must be simplified, timed, prolonged 
and intensified so as to make it possible for it to be 
added to itself by creating a differential of accumula-
tion. Marx’s postulate, upon which rests the entire 
argumentation of his ‘critique’, or upon which an 
analysis of objective categories and a phenomenology 
of lived experience are combined and complete each 
other, is that the articulation of surplus-labour with 
surplus-value (with the antagonism it engenders) must 
be thinkable at once on the level of the society as a 
whole (of the Gesamtkapital ‘organically’ composed of 
a certain relation between dead and living labour) and 
at the level of the smallest unit of exploitation; that 
is, each instant of a labourer’s life, inasmuch as that 
is the life of an exploited producer, or an alienated 
productive life. But in this vast critical task, which 
brings to the fore the antagonism and exploitation 
at the heart of the ‘contradictions’ of the economy, 
Marx nevertheless adopts, uncritically, certain fun-
damental ideas of political economy that allow him 
to represent to himself both society and the economy 
as balanced ‘machines’ and ‘processes’, self-regulating 
and self-productive, even if at the price of certain 
inequalities, crises or class struggles, all of which will 
persist at least as long as capitalism has not reached 
its ‘historical limit’. And the most fundamental of 
these ideas is precisely the idea of reproduction, as a 
moment separate from production but necessary to 
its perpetuity, without which there is neither society 
nor the accumulation of capital. Naturally, this is 
the place to recall that the notion of ‘reproduction’ 
immediately produced schisms within Marxism – 
the most famous being the one that pits Lenin’s 
interpretation against Rosa Luxemburg’s – and these 
are still with us today. Moreover, the notion involves, 
whether consciously or not, a play on words, given its 
double – economic and biological – meaning.31
To say this does not take away the admiration 
we might have for the way, in Volume 2 of Capital, 
Marx constructs ‘reproduction schemas’ that lend 
themselves to various readings. But it does lead us to 
try to lay bare the latent presuppositions that inform 
the crucial distinction between ‘productive labour’ 
and ‘unproductive labour’, among which fall a variety 
of ‘services’, notably social and educational services, 
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as well as the service of women, which render the 
consumption of labourers possible. I have come to 
think that, behind this aporia, there are not only 
sexist prejudices, or the inability to see exploitation in 
certain places and moments where it is nevertheless 
even more violent, as a whole body of feminist lit-
erature has shown, but also a political condition that 
is linked to my hypothesis regarding the transition 
towards a ‘pure’ capitalism (or the entry into a regime 
of ‘absolute capital’) and the transformations that 
transition imposes on the conditions of resistance – 
that is, on the very possibility of the class struggle. 
Because this resistance – from the Industrial Revolu-
tion and, most of all, from the first social legislations 
to those of the welfare state and of what Robert 
Castel and others call the ‘wage-earning society’ – 
was also made possible by the fact that the life of 
producers was split into two moments by means of a 
major anthropological rupture or difference between 
the moment of labour and that of reproduction, each 
of which entailed different forms of socialization.32 
But this is no longer the case, at least tendentially, 
in ‘pure’ capitalism, where reproduction – by means 
of the transformation of consumption, of health, 
of leisure, and, tendentially, of education into fields 
that capital invests in (fields called, precisely, ‘human 
capital’) – is completely incorporated into production 
itself.33 What that also means, again tendentially, is 
that sexual difference no longer has a ‘functional’ 
need from the point of view of capital (which is of 
course not to say that it has disappeared, even as a 
difference in social status, because it has other func-
tions and historical foundations). We should even ask 
if ‘intellectual difference’ – between educated and 
uneducated workers – retains the same functions and 
content, since I suspect that there is an extraordinary 
mystification in what we call the ‘intellectualization 
of work’.34 The great and essentially floating division, 
which achieved a sort of projection in the instance 
that Marx called the ‘reserve industrial army’, is the 
division between the precariously employed and the 
precariously unemployed. And we know that this dif-
ference, overdetermined by other factors of inequality 
with global reach, is potentially deadly.35 It is a new 
regime of the production, the distribution and the 
uses of bodies in capitalism, and it affects, without 
distinction, the ‘manual’ and ‘mental’ faculties, 
both of which have been profoundly dispersed and 
recomposed by information technology and a ‘post-
Taylorist’ organization of labour.36 
*
As you can see, my efforts have not resulted in a 
theory, or even in a critical problematic, in the style 
of a theory of reification, of one-dimensional man, or 
of territorialization–deterritorialization, or even of a 
post-Foucauldian ‘biopolitics’ – though I have tried 
to appropriate some of their questions. What I have 
tried to do is designate a ‘site’, which is itself abstract, 
in order to analyse the overlapping effects of religious 
determinations and the economic determinations 
of the atypical, indeed exceptional, crisis we find 
ourselves in, a crisis characterized by its global reach 
and the deadly intensification of acts of violence 
(which, it goes without saying, also have all sorts of 
other causes). This site would be the ‘body’, which 
is immediately split anew by a tension between two 
aspects at once inseparable and distinct, and whose 
unity is the enigma of anthropological discourse: 
the ‘symbolic (or signifying) body’, and the ‘produc-
tive (or utilitarian) body’, towards which converge, 
without being confused, a new post-Marxian critique 
of political economy and a critique of religion that 
does not yet presume itself to be ‘completed’.
Translated by Emiliano Battista
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